Principal Doctrine 3 June 5, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.comments closed
I’m not swamped with grading for the time being, so I’m now back to my obsession with Epicurean hedonism…
In my last post (Translation differences concerning pleasure), I offered three reasons for favoring the Epicurus.info version of PD 3 to the Epicurus Reader (ER) version. Then I sort of took back one of the reasons (the one about the lack of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain). Now I’d like to offer two more reasons for going with the Epicurus.info version. But first, just so we’re all on the same page, here again are the two versions of PD 3:
OLD NEWS:
The Epicurus Reader:
The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)
Epicurus.info:
Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)
I claimed that the ER version of PD 3 basically implies that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. The Epicurus.info version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain. My initial criticisms of the ER version revolved around the idea that it does not make sense to talk about the ‘limit’ of pleasure or ‘greatest’/’greater’ pleasure (which Epicurus does elsewhere — not just in PD 3) if there is just one degree of pleasure.
NEW NEWS:
1. My Greek translator (Dan) brought it to my attention that the second sentence of PD 3 has a definite article (‘to’) in front of ‘pleasure’. See: http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3
This may suggest that ‘the pleasure’ referred to in the second sentence is the same as the notion of pleasure referred to in the first sentence — namely, ‘maximal pleasure’, rather than ‘pleasure’ simpliciter.
2. Note what both versions of PD 3 say in the second sentence: that (maximal) pleasure and pain do not occur simultaneously. Some (e.g., Nikolsky 2001) have noted that this is inconsistent with what appears to be Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasures. In particular, when one is not already in a pain-free state, kinetic pleasures decrease pain by being involved in the process of desire-satisfaction. But since the process of satisfying a desire is a temporally extended event (it does not occur in an instant), presumably at some point one is both experiencing some kinetic pleasure (due to the partial satisfaction of desire D) and some pain (as desire D is not yet fully satisfied). (Perhaps it helps to imagine, for instance, the desire to drink a tall glass of water). According to this interpretation of Epicurus’ notion of kinetic pleasure, one can experience pain and pleasure simultaneously. But this is inconsistent with PD 3. I believe (Nikolsky notes) that this inconsistency has moved some to reinterpret Epicurus on kinetic pleasure. But I do not think we need to, and perhaps nor should we. For it is only inconsistent with the ER version of PD 3. On the Epicurus.info version, it is maximal pleasure that must not be concurrent with pain, not pleasure simpliciter. I wonder if anyone’s thought of interpreting PD 3 along the Epicurus.info lines for this reason.
Translation differences concerning pleasure May 30, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.comments closed
I am beginning to think that some of the Epicurus.info translations of the Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings concerning pleasure might be more careful and precise than those found in The Epicurus Reader. Three points.
1. Note the controversy over PD 19 mentioned previously. Though I’d like it if PD 19 did contain the term ‘amount’, it does not strictly appear in the Greek; and the Epicurus.info translation does not mention ‘amount’, but the The Epicurus Reader (potentially misleadingly) does.
2. For Vatican Saying 4, The Epicurus Reader reads “Every pain is easy to despise…” whereas Epicurus.info reads “Every pain is easily disregarded…” I have not looked at the actual Greek (or rather, begged someone who reads Greek to look at the actual Greek for me), but it seems to me that the Epicurus.info translation makes much more sense. To be sure, The Epicurus Reader translation likely means ‘despise’ in the sense of being unworthy of one’s concern (and so is similar to ‘disregard’), but ‘despise’ often means ‘strongly dislike’ or ‘detest’. This could be misleading. ‘Disregard’ seems better than ‘despise’, as it avoids these ambiguities.
3. A point about PD 3: The Epicurus Reader translation reads:
The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)
But this seems to imply that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. This can’t be what Epicurus meant, right?
The Epicurus.info translation of PD 3 avoids this, it reads:
Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)
This version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain.
Knowing the best translations/interpretations of these (and other) passages concerning pleasure will likely prove important if we are to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of Epicurean hedonism.
Understanding Epicurus on quantities of pleasure and the (in)significance of duration May 27, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.comments closed
As many of you know, I’m writing on Epicureanism and death. I’ve decided to specifically focus on the relation between Epicurean hedonism and the neutrality of death. Here are two things that have been giving me headaches:
(1) It has been said at various points throughout the quarter that, on the Epicurean conception of hedonism, pleasures cannot be ‘added up’ and/or that, for Epicurus, it does not make sense to talk of ‘amounts’ of pleasure. But I am having a hard time finding any clear Epicurean statements of or arguments for this claim.
To be sure, it is dubious Epicurus would go for Bentham’s hedonic calculus, but is there any clear evidence that Epicurus would object to any quantitative analysis of pleasure?
If there is, then my project might be in trouble.
Does Epicurus ever talk in terms of amounts of pleasure? Are there any reasons to think that talking in terms of amounts of pleasure would be incompatible with Epicureanism?
For instance, in Principle Doctrine 19, I thought that Epicurus might have meant something like ‘amount’. Here are three different translations I found:
(i): Inwood translation: Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning.
(ii): Warren translation: The infinite time has as much pleasure as the finite, if one measures pleasure’s limits with reason.
(iii): Furley translation: Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as finite time, if you measure the limits by calculation.
Yesterday, after noticing some notion of ‘amount of pleasure’ in all three of my translations of PD 19, I became optimistic that Epicurus really meant some amount or quantity of pleasure. But Dan burst my bubble. That is, Dan pointed out that the word ‘amount’ does not show up in the Greek. PD 19 only says that the pleasures are the same (perhaps, in quality) or equal — not necessarily equal in amount. Moreover, Dan called attention to the difference between “same pleasure as” and “as much pleasure as.” The latter has an explicitly quantitative connotation that the former need not.
If there is evidence from other Epicurean writings that ‘amounts’ talk is acceptable, then all this fuss over the precise translation of PD 19 might be irrelevant. Otherwise, these translations of PD 19 might be somewhat misleading.
In Warren’s book (Facing Death, pp. 143-144), I found a passage from Philodemus (De Morte) that also uses the term ‘amount’ (it seems to be restatement of PD 19 and 20):
…because any length of time naturally produces pleasure for all — provided one recognizes pleasure’s limits — and because of the fact that at the same time the flesh immediately receives the amount of pleasure equal to what an unlimited length of time provides…
Are there linguistic or philosophical reasons for taking the putative Epicurean quantitative talk seriously, or not?
(2) For Epicurean hedonism, does the duration of pleasure matter at all? In other words, given a pleasure of some intensity, is it better to have that pleasure (at that same intensity) for more time? Is it worse to have a pain for more time?
Some discussion of duration can be found in Letter to Menoeceus (in 126 and 129). In 126:
And just as he does not unconditionally choose the largest amount of food but the most pleasant food, so he savours not the longest time but the most pleasant. (Inwood translation)
I do not think this necessarily implies that, for Epicurus, duration does not matter at all. Maybe duration does not matter at all. Maybe it does, but it matters (much) less than quality. Or maybe Epicurus is only (rather non-controversially) pointing out that duration is not to be unconditionally chosen.
In 129:
…sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. (Inwood translation)
…there are times when we pass over many pleasures, when there is more disagreeableness for us in consequence; and we believe many pains to be better than pleasures, if and when a greater pleasure accompanies us for a long time if we endure the pains. (Hutchinson translation)
In both translations of 129, it seems that some weight is accorded to duration. If intensity or quality is all that matters, Epicurus might have just said that many pains are to be chosen over pleasures when a greater (i.e., more intense; high-quality) pleasure follows, and left it at that. Why mention “for a long time” if duration is totally irrelevant?
Long and Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers) seem to agree with me (therefore I cannot be completely crazy, right?):
Epicurus is not saying, as some have thought he was, that time as no bearing on the quantity of pleasure, but just that a finite time is as pleasant as an infinite time, provided one has lived a complete life. (p. 154, their italics)
Following Warren (ch. 4), one has lived a “complete life” once one experiences ataraxia (or, on a milder interpretation, experiences it for some given period of time). This seems a sensible way of understanding PD 19-21.
The significance of duration might depend on whether we’re talking about someone in ataraxia. That is, one might accept a split view about the significance of duration and claim that, when discussing the highest pleasure, duration does not matter, but that when discussing ordinary pleasures (not at the limit of pleasure), duration is important. After all, in Letter to Menoeceus 129 where duration is mentioned, it is not mentioned in connection with ataraxia but rather just everyday prudential reasoning. This split view with respect to duration might have some advantages over other views: it seems to fit with the Epicurean discussion on the fear of death (if one achieves ataraxia, one is not missing out on anything by not living forever), but it also putatively avoids Cicero’s objection in De Finibus 2.68 (by claiming that the duration of a pain does matter). I think common sense would judge that, all else equal, it is worse to experience a pain for more time rather than less. The split view would accommodate such a judgment.
Any thoughts on any of this?
Any more reading suggestions?
Epicurus and the Experience Machine May 14, 2008
Posted by Cole in Epicurus, Pleasure.comments closed
While I’m at it, I might as well post this other thought I had a while ago. I know imposing modern thought experiments on ancient philosophers may not work, but I wanted to sound other people out on this idea. I assume people are somewhat familiar with the idea behind Robert Nozick’s experience machine. People can get plugged into it and experience the best life they can dream of, presumably for an Epicurean it would be one of ataraxia. The bottom line of this thought experiment is that most people would choose not to go into the experience machine and live their current lives. My question is, is this faulty reasoning from an Epicurean point of view? I know the Epicurean philosophy is about adapting to this life and making it as untroubled as possible, and that this idea might not make sense to an ancient Greek. However, it seems that if confronted with the possibility of experiencing a life of pleasure and ataraxia without any disturbance were presented, shouldn’t the principles of Epicurean philosophy mandate that one take advantage of that possibility?
questions about Epicurus’s use of sense-perception May 14, 2008
Posted by Cole in Epicurus.comments closed
Sorry I haven’t posted this earlier, as I have had the question for awhile and just not posted it. There are many places in Epicurus’s writings as well as those of Lucretius where sense-perception is taken to be foundational and unquestionably true, and is the basis for scientific reasoning as well as living generally. My question is that he seems to contradict this on a few occasions to suit his other purposes. The main problem is with his view of the gods. He argues that since people do in fact perceive them, that they exist. The problem is that Epicurus says that the manner in which the gods exist (untroubled, unconcerned with human affairs, etc.) is not how people perceived the gods. Presumably people had visions of the gods acting like they do in traditional Greek mythology. So on one had, he reasons to the existence of gods by appealing to sense-perception and its unquestionable foundational stature, but then proceeds to say that the gods don’t exist as they are perceived by the senses.
I know Epicurus says that it is opinions added after the sense-perception is perceived that add these problems (like visions of dead people acting in dreams are not really ghosts, just atoms thrown off by the dead person). But I just don’t know if this will work. If sense-perceptions are veridical, and the gods or dead spirits are perceived to do something by the senses, shouldn’t what is perceived be considered true. He should not be able to pick and choose which sense-perceptions provide reliable evidence and which ones are altered from within if they are all to be considered true. If not, the foundational veridicality of sense-perception seems questionable. If any one can lead me out of confusion into the light of Epicurus’s garden, I would appreciate it.
Epicureanism and the harm of death May 3, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Lucretius, Philosophy.Tags: Death
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Here are some of the more or less distinct arguments I have been able to identify:
1. The “death is nothing to us” argument from Letter to Menoeceus. “Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience” (124). And “since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. Therefore, it is relevant neither to the living nor to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter do not exist” (125).
- Death is annihilation.
- The living have not yet been annihilated (otherwise they wouldn’t be alive).
- Death does not affect the living. (from 1 and 2)
- So, death is not bad for the living. (from 3)
- For something to be bad for somebody, that person has to exist, at least.
- The dead do not exist. (from 1)
- Therefore, death is not bad for the dead. (from 5 and 6)
- Therefore death is bad for neither the living nor the dead. (from 4 and 7)
2. The arguments concerning the Epicurean indifference to the temporal duration of the good (e.g., PD 19, 20; elsewhere), can be connected to the claim that death is not a harm. There appears to be textual evidence that this connection was intended or appreciated, e.g., Letter to Menoeceus 126, De Rerum Natura 3.940-50, 3.1088-90, probably elsewhere. (Lucretius’ point that “we cannot deduct a single moment of the time of our death” seems kind of irrelevant to me, as I would not think of the aim as minimizing the time that one is dead [an infinite span of time], but rather increasing the amount of time one spends enjoying life).
Since what gets identified with the highest good cannot be increased with time, cutting one’s pleasure short (via death) cannot be construed as a deprivation of goods. And so even if we allow that depriving someone of a good constitutes a harm, this does not occur in death. However, as I’ve expressed before, this notion of indifference to temporal duration is very mysterious to me — even on the assumption that the good for Epicureans involves a state of aponia and ataraxia. Nowhere in the readings can I find a cogent argument for such temporal duration indifference. Being in a good state for a longer period of time seems (all else equal) better than being in a good state for a shorter period of time.
If temporal duration indifference about the good is justified, this would seem to support the conclusion that death is not a harm. However, it seems that it could do so in a rather straightforward manner. Roughly: since more life is not better, and since death involves no negative sense experience, death is not a harm (or a bad thing). But then this seems to make the “no subject of harm” considerations (mentioned in Letter to Menoeceus) superfluous.
3. Lucretius’ “symmetry argument”: “Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep?” (De Rerum Natura 3.972-6).
Now, this might be interpreted not as an argument for the conclusion that death is not a harm, but rather merely as remarks intended to ameliorate one’s fear of death. The latter seems to be a viable interpretation, and I would not have much (if anything) to say against Lucretius on this score. But if this passage was intended to be an argument about the harmlessness of death, it does not seem to be very persuasive.
The most I would see it doing on this score is reiterating Epicurus’ claim that good and bad must consist in some sense-experience. It does not address the commonsense idea that a deprivation of a good is a bad thing (independent of any negative sense experience associated with the deprivation).
If deprivation of good is generally a bad thing, then we might accept some kind of temporal symmetry — and claim both that it is bad that a good life will not continue indefinitely into the future and that it is bad that a good life did not begin indefinitely far into the past. If deprivation of a good is not generally a bad thing, but a bad thing when it deprives, e.g., an identifiable individual (as opposed to possible, indeterminate individuals) of goods, then we might accept a kind of temporal asymmetry — and claim that, for a particular individual living a good life, while it is a bad thing that her life will not continue indefinitely into the future, it does not make sense to think of it as a bad thing that she was not born earlier. There are various reasons for deciding between an asymmetric view versus a symmetric view (e.g., whether harms and benefits must affect identifiable individuals; whether harms and benefits are relative to existent desires, etc.). Asymmetric views tend to think it sensible to speak of the harm or badness of death, but not of the harm or badness of not ever having been brought into existence. (Also see Thomas Nagel’s paper “Death” in Mortal Questions; and Parfit discusses many of these sorts issues in Reasons and Persons).
4. If Epicureans lack a single, coherent argument to the conclusion that death is not a harm, then perhaps their multiple distinct arguments to this conclusion might be best explained by the pressing need to justify holding an anxiety-reducing belief (that death is not a harm). Without conclusive evidence that none of the Epicurean arguments establish the claim that death is not a harm, the below suggestion may seem uncharitable of me. However, perhaps the implicit reasoning of Epicureans went something like this: If we believe that death constitutes a harm (or a bad event) for us, then we will fear death. We should not fear death (as it causes unnecessary suffering). Therefore, we should not believe that death constitutes a harm for us. However, this line of reasoning would (at best) only support the conclusion that we should not believe that death is a harm for us, not that death is not (really) a harm for us.
Necessity and laws May 1, 2008
Posted by Mungovanlowe in Epicurus.Tags: Democritus, Necessity
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I think that what Schiesaro (as quoted by Don in an eariler post) says about Lucretius’ conception of laws in DRN is compelling. It definitely gives an answer to one half of the question I asked at the beginning of class two weeks ago (week 4), namely, what is the status of laws in DRN. However, another half of my question, which I never explicitly voiced in class, is still bothering me. Now that we have a sense of what Lucretius means by laws and that he (may) conceives of them as “prevailing forms of association among compatible atoms that emerged at the beginning of the world and which natural reproduction has inherited,” I want to know how exactly he and other Epicureans (including Epicurus himself) differed from someone like Democritus who supposedly committed himself to a very deterministic world.
As I understand it, Democritus held that the state of the world at any point is the way it is by necessity. This is confirmed by Cicero in De Fato (excerpted in The Epicurus Reader), where he claims that Epicurus tainted the purity of Democritean deterministic atomism by positing ‘the swerve’. Clearly, the swerve is the central difference. Democritus’ atomic motion was necessitated, while Epicurean atomic motion is necessitated but with occassional swerves. At the level of explanation employed by Lucretius, I understand the nature of the swerve and its role in explaining observable phenomena (free willing). I do not, however, completely understand the nature of necessity, which seems to require explanation at a lower (more basic) level.
What exactly is necessary about atomic motion and interaction for Democritus and Epicurus-minus-swerve? Is it the geometrical properties that give rise to their necessary associations? In his explanation of Lucretian laws, Schiesaro talks about ‘prevailing forms of association’ and also about ‘compatible atoms’. I assume that ‘prevailing forms of association’ refers to the regularities observed when, for example, a being reproduces sexually a new being of the same type. Is the notion of ‘compatible atoms’ the notion that is relevant to necessity? Is compatibility to be understood geometrically? If so, is this the limit of necessity? Does their natural downward tendency count as part of their necessary motion?
Animus, anima, mens, et al. April 24, 2008
Posted by voidobsequy in Lucretius, Philosophy, Pleasure.Tags: Add new tag
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So, I looked over the Latin for the passage we briefly discussed at the end of the last class. This is III.135-145 or so. Briefly, our translation says that the mind and spirit form a substance. The ruler of the body is reason, called mind or intelligence.Later we hear that the rest of the soul is obedient to the will and mind.
Well, in Latin, we’ve got that the animus (mind/will/soul) and the anima (soul/breath/life) are fused in one natura (nature, not substance!) The ruler is the consilium (reason/judgement/will) which we call animus and mens (mind/intellect). The rest of the anima (same word as earlier!) is obedient to the numen (divine will/divine presence/god) and mens.
I’m just going by my abridged Oxford Latin dictionary here for the translations. So, two things jump out at me. First, where we have soul and spirit, the original just has anima. Second, natura is almost always best translated as nature, in my (well, pretty limited) experience. Substance fits the context, but it feels like a jump from the Latin.
A few other issues. I’m not totally clear on this, but I think “animus” is generally something like the mind and “anima” is generally something like an animating principal. Also, “consilium”, “animus” and “mens” all seem to identified with each other. Now, what to do with “numen”? Both our translation and the old Loeb give “will” for this, so maybe we should trust them. I’m just not that familiar with the term.
Brownian Motion April 24, 2008
Posted by voidobsequy in Epicurus, Lucretius, Philosophy.comments closed
This was something I wanted to draw attention to in class, just cause I thought it was neat. One of Lucretius’s arguments for the existence of atoms (II.125-142) seems to be the same as the argument in Einstein’s first published paper, which (as far as I know) used Brownian motion as evidence for the existence of atoms. That’s kick-ass. Of course, Einstein included detailed mathematical calculations and also included empirical verification of some of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanical predictions.
I think he also has the Stosszahlansatz at II.85.
-Nat
Lucretius on “laws of nature” April 24, 2008
Posted by Don in Lucretius.comments closed
While depriving laws of any metaphysical origin, Lucretius places them at the very heart of his atomistic cosmos as he constructs in the DNR a legal model of the universe…. In Lucretius’ account of the universe, nexus ‘bonds’, foedera ‘pacts’ and leges ‘laws’ account for the behavior of atoms and their combination into concilia ‘unions’, another term with legal and political implications, and thus form a coherent system for the rational understanding of nature. Lucretius’ foedera naturae and leges possess a strong empiricist foundation; ‘laws of nature’ are the projection into the infinity of time of the prevailing forms of association among compatible atoms that emerged at the beginning of the world and which natural reproduction has inherited. As such, they are reliable, yet consistent with the indeterminacy and contingency of a mechanistic universe…. Lucretius’ laws of nature do not exist outside and above the physicality of atoms, do not answer an inscrutable teleological project and have not been promoted by a provident lawgiver. ‘Natural laws’ crystallise post factum the workings of nature, and embody a ‘deeply fixed’ (1.77) terminus for each creature, a limitation of possibilities which prevents anarchy in the physical world.
From Alessandro Schiesaro, “Lucretius and Roman politics and history” (in The Cambridge Companion to Lucretius, ed. Gillespie and Hallie, pp. 47-8). See also A.A. Long, “Chance and natural law in Epicureanism,” Phronesis 22 (1977): 63-88.
Smooth Motions 