Is Epicurus really opposed to maximizing? Why? April 9, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.trackback
I’ve got a question about what we were discussing toward the end of seminar today. It concerns the rational temporal allocation of pleasure, and whether and why Epicurus is really opposed to a pleasure-maximizing view. When it comes to the rationality of allocating pleasure and pain across time, I think I more or less grasp the difference between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics are presentists; they are only concerned with pleasures and pains in the present. Epicurus, on the other hand, is concerned with pleasures and pains throughout one’s entire life.
I am having more trouble understanding the ways in which Epicurus’ view is supposed to significantly contrast with classical utilitarian views (in particular, Bentham and Sidgwick) on this score. I am here abstracting away from the various ways in which the classical utilitarians may differ from Epicurus on (1) what pleasure consists in (e.g., a pain-free experience, an experience that qualitatively feels enjoyable, an experience that one desires to continue, etc.) and (2) what a pleasurable episode consists in (e.g., the sum of all the momentary pleasures from t1 to t2; a particular state that persists between t1 and t2). That is to say, I am here less concerned with the nature of the unit of prudence, but more concerned with how it ought to be allocated across time.
Of course, one might reasonably object that these two questions cannot be separated, though it seems plausible to me that they can. Assuming we are only dealing with the latter question — “how should the unit of prudence be rationally temporally allocated?” — I am not sure how or why Epicurus would substantively differ from Bentham or Sidgwick. I am assuming that the Benthamite/Sidgwickian view about rational prudence roughly says: it is rational to maximize the ratio of pleasure to pain across all of the time-slices of one’s life, giving equal weight to all time-slices in allocating pleasure and pain. (Of course, utilitarians think this applies interpersonally as well as intertemporally, but I am here only concerned with prudence, and not morality or other-regarding rationality).
One objection to the Benthamite view might be that pleasure cannot be quantified — that we do not readily have, or cannot possibly build, a ‘hedonometer’. But this seems to be an empirical or descriptive claim. It also seems to only address the practicality of implementing a full-blown Benthamite project, not whether a Bentham-like view is plausible in theory. A related worry is that we cannot perform the pleasure calculus because it is too impractical. But then this is a claim about the practicality of the pleasure calculus as a decision procedure, not as a criterion of prudential rationality or what makes one’s life go best. One might think that one’s life goes better just in case one has a higher pleasure to pain ratio and nevertheless agree that it would be impractical to apply the pleasure calculus for every decision one makes (and prescribe some other decision procedure). Yet another worry is that one cannot give equal weight to all time-slices because one cannot be certain that one will actually experience temporally distant time-slices. But then one is not failing to be neutral about time-slices, but only taking into account that distant time-slices are less probable than more proximate ones, and so, ceteris paribus, their expected utility is lower. This does not imply that distant future pleasures are intrinsically worth less than proximate future pleasures. (Though note that there may be some disagreement between Bentham and Sidgwick on this last point, as Bentham may count propinquity as an actual dimension of pleasure).
Perhaps I have overlooked an obvious way in which Epicurus differs from Bentham or Sidgwick when it comes to rationally temporally allocating pleasures and pains. I have a suspicion that Epicurus has a more fundamental reason for disagreeing with pleasure-maximizing views than any of the ones I have listed. But perhaps this suspicion is misguided. If it is, then I am dubious he really substantively disagrees with pleasure-maximizing views. If it is not, then I am simply puzzled. Assuming X is the only thing that makes a life go well, why does not having more X make a life go even better?
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After talking to Don and Monte after class, I think that the very idea of maximizing pleasure, or doing a pleasure calculus, would not have made sense to the Greeks, or at least the Epicureans. The goal is to get into the state of aponia and ataraxia and remain there, as this is the highest state one can be in, and there can be no pleasure added to it: “As soon as the feeling of pain produced by want is removed, pleasure in the flesh will not increase but is only varied” (PD 18). The idea of maximizing by trying to add to that state, say by having an ice cream cone, does not add to pleasure unless it satisfied some want, but in that state it was assumed that there were no feelings of want. Additionally, if people were continually thinking of how to maximize their pleasure, they would no longer be in a state of ataraxia, as they would always be troubled as to whether they were actually content. Thinking about whether one will be in that state in the future also removes ataraxia, so dwelling on that will also not help. One must simply enjoy the contented state and not try to maximize it or worry whether one’s potential future states will have it.
I am prepared to provisionally accept the claim that the idea of maximizing is one that would not make sense to Epicureans. This claim seems quite sensible. Less clear is *why* Epicureans would *substantively* reject a maximizing view as articulated in my initial post.
I was considering maximizing in the context of a criterion of rationality or of what makes a life go best — not a practical decision procedure. Recognition of this distinction should help eschew one sort of objection to maximizing views you mentioned, i.e., “if people were continually thinking of how to maximize X, they would fail to maximize X.” Note, however, that one might reject the distinction between criteria of rationality or what makes a life go best and decision procedures. Perhaps there is evidence that Epicurus would take this line. (During the first seminar Monte mentioned that, for Epicureans, the distinction between theory and practice is largely nonexistent).
Also, in my initial post, I supposed it possible to abstract away from what pleasure consists in, and ask whether the “units of prudence” (however they are construed) should be straightforwardly maximized across one’s lifetime. On Epicurus’ view, for the person in a state of aponia and ataraxia, additional licks of ice cream would not increase pleasure. So I do not see my questions about maximizing putting any pressure on Epicurus in this way. However, as Don mentioned a couple of seminars ago, one might ask: if pleasure consists in a particular state, then why is not being in that state longer better? I think phrasing the queries about maximizing in terms of sensitivity to duration makes sense. Also take note of Cicero’s remarks in book II, 88.
Theories of prudence insensitive to duration strike me as highly counterintuitive. For, in the case of hedonism, they seem to imply that a life in pleasurable state P that lasts for an hour is no worse than a life in pleasurable state P that last for 100 years. This is prima facie implausible. Theories of prudence insensitive to duration also seem to be logically awkward. Whatever justifies that having P for some period of time is better than not having P would appear to also (to some extent) justify that having P for a longer period of time is better than having P for a shorter period of time. At the very least, a view of prudence indifferent to duration owes us a rationale for being indifferent.