Epicureanism and the harm of death May 3, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Lucretius, Philosophy.Tags: Death
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Here are some of the more or less distinct arguments I have been able to identify:
1. The “death is nothing to us” argument from Letter to Menoeceus. “Get used to believing that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in sense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience” (124). And “since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist. Therefore, it is relevant neither to the living nor to the dead, since it does not affect the former, and the latter do not exist” (125).
- Death is annihilation.
- The living have not yet been annihilated (otherwise they wouldn’t be alive).
- Death does not affect the living. (from 1 and 2)
- So, death is not bad for the living. (from 3)
- For something to be bad for somebody, that person has to exist, at least.
- The dead do not exist. (from 1)
- Therefore, death is not bad for the dead. (from 5 and 6)
- Therefore death is bad for neither the living nor the dead. (from 4 and 7)
2. The arguments concerning the Epicurean indifference to the temporal duration of the good (e.g., PD 19, 20; elsewhere), can be connected to the claim that death is not a harm. There appears to be textual evidence that this connection was intended or appreciated, e.g., Letter to Menoeceus 126, De Rerum Natura 3.940-50, 3.1088-90, probably elsewhere. (Lucretius’ point that “we cannot deduct a single moment of the time of our death” seems kind of irrelevant to me, as I would not think of the aim as minimizing the time that one is dead [an infinite span of time], but rather increasing the amount of time one spends enjoying life).
Since what gets identified with the highest good cannot be increased with time, cutting one’s pleasure short (via death) cannot be construed as a deprivation of goods. And so even if we allow that depriving someone of a good constitutes a harm, this does not occur in death. However, as I’ve expressed before, this notion of indifference to temporal duration is very mysterious to me — even on the assumption that the good for Epicureans involves a state of aponia and ataraxia. Nowhere in the readings can I find a cogent argument for such temporal duration indifference. Being in a good state for a longer period of time seems (all else equal) better than being in a good state for a shorter period of time.
If temporal duration indifference about the good is justified, this would seem to support the conclusion that death is not a harm. However, it seems that it could do so in a rather straightforward manner. Roughly: since more life is not better, and since death involves no negative sense experience, death is not a harm (or a bad thing). But then this seems to make the “no subject of harm” considerations (mentioned in Letter to Menoeceus) superfluous.
3. Lucretius’ “symmetry argument”: “Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it? Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the deepest sleep?” (De Rerum Natura 3.972-6).
Now, this might be interpreted not as an argument for the conclusion that death is not a harm, but rather merely as remarks intended to ameliorate one’s fear of death. The latter seems to be a viable interpretation, and I would not have much (if anything) to say against Lucretius on this score. But if this passage was intended to be an argument about the harmlessness of death, it does not seem to be very persuasive.
The most I would see it doing on this score is reiterating Epicurus’ claim that good and bad must consist in some sense-experience. It does not address the commonsense idea that a deprivation of a good is a bad thing (independent of any negative sense experience associated with the deprivation).
If deprivation of good is generally a bad thing, then we might accept some kind of temporal symmetry — and claim both that it is bad that a good life will not continue indefinitely into the future and that it is bad that a good life did not begin indefinitely far into the past. If deprivation of a good is not generally a bad thing, but a bad thing when it deprives, e.g., an identifiable individual (as opposed to possible, indeterminate individuals) of goods, then we might accept a kind of temporal asymmetry — and claim that, for a particular individual living a good life, while it is a bad thing that her life will not continue indefinitely into the future, it does not make sense to think of it as a bad thing that she was not born earlier. There are various reasons for deciding between an asymmetric view versus a symmetric view (e.g., whether harms and benefits must affect identifiable individuals; whether harms and benefits are relative to existent desires, etc.). Asymmetric views tend to think it sensible to speak of the harm or badness of death, but not of the harm or badness of not ever having been brought into existence. (Also see Thomas Nagel’s paper “Death” in Mortal Questions; and Parfit discusses many of these sorts issues in Reasons and Persons).
4. If Epicureans lack a single, coherent argument to the conclusion that death is not a harm, then perhaps their multiple distinct arguments to this conclusion might be best explained by the pressing need to justify holding an anxiety-reducing belief (that death is not a harm). Without conclusive evidence that none of the Epicurean arguments establish the claim that death is not a harm, the below suggestion may seem uncharitable of me. However, perhaps the implicit reasoning of Epicureans went something like this: If we believe that death constitutes a harm (or a bad event) for us, then we will fear death. We should not fear death (as it causes unnecessary suffering). Therefore, we should not believe that death constitutes a harm for us. However, this line of reasoning would (at best) only support the conclusion that we should not believe that death is a harm for us, not that death is not (really) a harm for us.
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There is a lot of really good bilbiography on this topic. If I were you I’d start with Furley’s article in *Norms of nature* and then go to the essays collected by J. M. Fischer in *The metaphysics of death* (Stanford). Fred Feldman’s book *Confrontations with the reaper* (OUP) is clear and helpful. Then there’s my own *Facing death: Epicurus and his critics* (OUP). I’d be very interested to hear what you think of it.
Another student of mine, an undergraduate, has the UCSD library copy of James’ book (Facing Death, OUP, 2004) out– he’s doing a project on a similar topic. I’ll try to wrest it out of his hands on Tuesday and give it to you (or, if worse comes to worse loan you my own copy). It is the obvious starting point.
If you have not yet done so, see James Warren’s comments on Epicurus and Sidgwick:
http://kenodoxia.blogspot.com/2008/05/chin-up.html
I think that your point about deprivation (caused by death) being (or not being) a good is an important point and one that I don’t recall being taken explicitly by Epicurus or his supporters.
If death is a harm, it is a harm because it is an end of a good life. (Deaths of people with bad lives presumably aren’t bad.) But a good life ending is not harmful in the way that pains are harmful; rather it is harmful in the way that deprivation of pleasures is (intuitively) harmful. More pleasures are preferable than fewer.
But, for Epicurus, harm is definitely tied to sense-perception. The question is should he be sympathetic to the notion that deprivation constitutes a harm? In one sense, he definitely would be sympathetic. After all, he says that katastematic pleasure is achieved by eliminating the disturbances caused, at least in part, by deprivations. But, of course, these sorts of deprivations are also associated with pains (or at least disturbances), and thus with sense-perception.
This isn’t yet saying anything more than you (Theron) said, but it does make extra clear that Epicurus would demand some sort of concrete sense in which your notion of deprivation (as simple absence of pleasure) can be understood as harmful. He gives definitions of pleasures and pains in terms of smooth motions and stable undisturbedness and disturbedness, respectively.
I am beginning to think that it may just be a battle of intuitions. You ask why more time in a state of pleasure isn’t better and he asks how an end to a pleasurable state can be considered harmful without any associated disturbance.
I wonder if maybe the idea of deprivation (as absence of continued pleasure, but without pain) you’re pushing is not better associated, not with a discussion of the good life, but with a discussion of what is fair. Take the case of a young child who is virtually guaranteed to live a good life, but dies suddenly (and without pain). My intuitions about what is tragic in that situation is that it is unfair. Everyone deserves a chance to live her life and this is true whether or not the life will be one of pain or pleasure. But maybe you would just say that judging the fairness or unfairness requires knowing whether the deprivation caused by death is deprivation of a pleasurable life or a painful life and that deprivation of a painful life would not be as tragic and not as unfair.
I also wonder if maybe the intuition that a longer state of pleasure is better than a shorter one is somehow tied to the idea that there is a “system” in which the amount of pleasure at any moment can be quantified. So, for example, maybe the world is a system and the end of a pleasurable life is a net loss to the system. This would explain the harm, though not in a way that Epicurus would like. It seems like his conception of pleasure is tied to individuals.
If the “system” conception lies behind your intuition presumably you would say that, in a world with a single individual living a pleasurable life, the end of that person’s life would be bad because it would deprive her of future pleasure. And, of course, it seems like Epicurus would disagree, again because there is not pain or disturbance inflicted on the person. I think that my intuitions are with Epicurus when we make the system this small and that makes me think that there is some other reason than the loss of pleasure that is behind my intuition that deprivation (caused by death) is harmful
One last (poorly worked out) thought is that perhaps Epicurus can just agree with you that a longer life is sometimes better than a shorter one. It seems clear, that however well we can approximate the stable pleasure of the gods, we cannot achieve such a state. Our lives are a constant striving for a state of katastematic pleasure (that can never be achieved) via the elimination of pain and disturbance. On this account it seems like Epicurus might concede that, for those people who have a chance of achieving a state of less disturbedness than they presently have, a longer life is better than a shorter one. Of course, those without a chance to achieve a state with fewer disturbances than they presently have would not be benefited by a longer life. But that is something you (Theron) would accept as well. The deaths of people living bad lives (beyond repair) are not bad. The deprivation of this chance to achieve a state of less disturbance might then reasonably be judged harmful, though in a different way than pain and disturbance is harmful, by Epicurus.
I don’t actually think he would like that last point.