If death is a harm, it is a harm because it is an end of a good life. (Deaths of people with bad lives presumably aren’t bad.) But a good life ending is not harmful in the way that pains are harmful; rather it is harmful in the way that deprivation of pleasures is (intuitively) harmful. More pleasures are preferable than fewer.

But, for Epicurus, harm is definitely tied to sense-perception. The question is should he be sympathetic to the notion that deprivation constitutes a harm? In one sense, he definitely would be sympathetic. After all, he says that katastematic pleasure is achieved by eliminating the disturbances caused, at least in part, by deprivations. But, of course, these sorts of deprivations are also associated with pains (or at least disturbances), and thus with sense-perception.

This isn’t yet saying anything more than you (Theron) said, but it does make extra clear that Epicurus would demand some sort of concrete sense in which your notion of deprivation (as simple absence of pleasure) can be understood as harmful. He gives definitions of pleasures and pains in terms of smooth motions and stable undisturbedness and disturbedness, respectively.

I am beginning to think that it may just be a battle of intuitions. You ask why more time in a state of pleasure isn’t better and he asks how an end to a pleasurable state can be considered harmful without any associated disturbance.

I wonder if maybe the idea of deprivation (as absence of continued pleasure, but without pain) you’re pushing is not better associated, not with a discussion of the good life, but with a discussion of what is fair. Take the case of a young child who is virtually guaranteed to live a good life, but dies suddenly (and without pain). My intuitions about what is tragic in that situation is that it is unfair. Everyone deserves a chance to live her life and this is true whether or not the life will be one of pain or pleasure. But maybe you would just say that judging the fairness or unfairness requires knowing whether the deprivation caused by death is deprivation of a pleasurable life or a painful life and that deprivation of a painful life would not be as tragic and not as unfair.

I also wonder if maybe the intuition that a longer state of pleasure is better than a shorter one is somehow tied to the idea that there is a “system” in which the amount of pleasure at any moment can be quantified. So, for example, maybe the world is a system and the end of a pleasurable life is a net loss to the system. This would explain the harm, though not in a way that Epicurus would like. It seems like his conception of pleasure is tied to individuals.

If the “system” conception lies behind your intuition presumably you would say that, in a world with a single individual living a pleasurable life, the end of that person’s life would be bad because it would deprive her of future pleasure. And, of course, it seems like Epicurus would disagree, again because there is not pain or disturbance inflicted on the person. I think that my intuitions are with Epicurus when we make the system this small and that makes me think that there is some other reason than the loss of pleasure that is behind my intuition that deprivation (caused by death) is harmful

One last (poorly worked out) thought is that perhaps Epicurus can just agree with you that a longer life is sometimes better than a shorter one. It seems clear, that however well we can approximate the stable pleasure of the gods, we cannot achieve such a state. Our lives are a constant striving for a state of katastematic pleasure (that can never be achieved) via the elimination of pain and disturbance. On this account it seems like Epicurus might concede that, for those people who have a chance of achieving a state of less disturbedness than they presently have, a longer life is better than a shorter one. Of course, those without a chance to achieve a state with fewer disturbances than they presently have would not be benefited by a longer life. But that is something you (Theron) would accept as well. The deaths of people living bad lives (beyond repair) are not bad. The deprivation of this chance to achieve a state of less disturbance might then reasonably be judged harmful, though in a different way than pain and disturbance is harmful, by Epicurus.

I don’t actually think he would like that last point.

http://kenodoxia.blogspot.com/2008/05/chin-up.html