Understanding Epicurus on quantities of pleasure and the (in)significance of duration May 27, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.trackback
As many of you know, I’m writing on Epicureanism and death. I’ve decided to specifically focus on the relation between Epicurean hedonism and the neutrality of death. Here are two things that have been giving me headaches:
(1) It has been said at various points throughout the quarter that, on the Epicurean conception of hedonism, pleasures cannot be ‘added up’ and/or that, for Epicurus, it does not make sense to talk of ‘amounts’ of pleasure. But I am having a hard time finding any clear Epicurean statements of or arguments for this claim.
To be sure, it is dubious Epicurus would go for Bentham’s hedonic calculus, but is there any clear evidence that Epicurus would object to any quantitative analysis of pleasure?
If there is, then my project might be in trouble.
Does Epicurus ever talk in terms of amounts of pleasure? Are there any reasons to think that talking in terms of amounts of pleasure would be incompatible with Epicureanism?
For instance, in Principle Doctrine 19, I thought that Epicurus might have meant something like ‘amount’. Here are three different translations I found:
(i): Inwood translation: Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning.
(ii): Warren translation: The infinite time has as much pleasure as the finite, if one measures pleasure’s limits with reason.
(iii): Furley translation: Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as finite time, if you measure the limits by calculation.
Yesterday, after noticing some notion of ‘amount of pleasure’ in all three of my translations of PD 19, I became optimistic that Epicurus really meant some amount or quantity of pleasure. But Dan burst my bubble. That is, Dan pointed out that the word ‘amount’ does not show up in the Greek. PD 19 only says that the pleasures are the same (perhaps, in quality) or equal — not necessarily equal in amount. Moreover, Dan called attention to the difference between “same pleasure as” and “as much pleasure as.” The latter has an explicitly quantitative connotation that the former need not.
If there is evidence from other Epicurean writings that ‘amounts’ talk is acceptable, then all this fuss over the precise translation of PD 19 might be irrelevant. Otherwise, these translations of PD 19 might be somewhat misleading.
In Warren’s book (Facing Death, pp. 143-144), I found a passage from Philodemus (De Morte) that also uses the term ‘amount’ (it seems to be restatement of PD 19 and 20):
…because any length of time naturally produces pleasure for all — provided one recognizes pleasure’s limits — and because of the fact that at the same time the flesh immediately receives the amount of pleasure equal to what an unlimited length of time provides…
Are there linguistic or philosophical reasons for taking the putative Epicurean quantitative talk seriously, or not?
(2) For Epicurean hedonism, does the duration of pleasure matter at all? In other words, given a pleasure of some intensity, is it better to have that pleasure (at that same intensity) for more time? Is it worse to have a pain for more time?
Some discussion of duration can be found in Letter to Menoeceus (in 126 and 129). In 126:
And just as he does not unconditionally choose the largest amount of food but the most pleasant food, so he savours not the longest time but the most pleasant. (Inwood translation)
I do not think this necessarily implies that, for Epicurus, duration does not matter at all. Maybe duration does not matter at all. Maybe it does, but it matters (much) less than quality. Or maybe Epicurus is only (rather non-controversially) pointing out that duration is not to be unconditionally chosen.
In 129:
…sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. (Inwood translation)
…there are times when we pass over many pleasures, when there is more disagreeableness for us in consequence; and we believe many pains to be better than pleasures, if and when a greater pleasure accompanies us for a long time if we endure the pains. (Hutchinson translation)
In both translations of 129, it seems that some weight is accorded to duration. If intensity or quality is all that matters, Epicurus might have just said that many pains are to be chosen over pleasures when a greater (i.e., more intense; high-quality) pleasure follows, and left it at that. Why mention “for a long time” if duration is totally irrelevant?
Long and Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers) seem to agree with me (therefore I cannot be completely crazy, right?):
Epicurus is not saying, as some have thought he was, that time as no bearing on the quantity of pleasure, but just that a finite time is as pleasant as an infinite time, provided one has lived a complete life. (p. 154, their italics)
Following Warren (ch. 4), one has lived a “complete life” once one experiences ataraxia (or, on a milder interpretation, experiences it for some given period of time). This seems a sensible way of understanding PD 19-21.
The significance of duration might depend on whether we’re talking about someone in ataraxia. That is, one might accept a split view about the significance of duration and claim that, when discussing the highest pleasure, duration does not matter, but that when discussing ordinary pleasures (not at the limit of pleasure), duration is important. After all, in Letter to Menoeceus 129 where duration is mentioned, it is not mentioned in connection with ataraxia but rather just everyday prudential reasoning. This split view with respect to duration might have some advantages over other views: it seems to fit with the Epicurean discussion on the fear of death (if one achieves ataraxia, one is not missing out on anything by not living forever), but it also putatively avoids Cicero’s objection in De Finibus 2.68 (by claiming that the duration of a pain does matter). I think common sense would judge that, all else equal, it is worse to experience a pain for more time rather than less. The split view would accommodate such a judgment.
Any thoughts on any of this?
Any more reading suggestions?
Comments
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The Philodemus quote from De Morte does indeed say “megethos tes hedones,” magnitude of pleasure. I am open to reasons to translate (or interpret) PD 19 in a similar manner, but it seems much less obvious to me than this Philodemus quote.
These are very good questions. I’ve been perplexed by this for some time. Here are some other factors I think worth considering. I don’t have answers to them, I’m afraid.
1. The Long-Sedley view:
‘Epicurus is not saying, as some have thought he was, that time as no bearing on the quantity of pleasure, but just that a finite time is as pleasant as an infinite time, provided one has lived a complete life.’
Certainly this is what the KD in question says. But this is a pretty weak claim and, it seems to me, not enough to allay the fear of premature death effectively. It seems to allow that someone can live with no pain but still not yet live a complete life (you have to wait for some as yet unspecified time to qualify for that). I have two questions in that case: (i) How long is long enough? Are the Epicureans vulnerable to a sorites argument? (One less second of pleasure surely won’t make a difference…) (ii) What about the person who is pain-free but not yet living a complete life? Should he be concerned that he might die prematurely? (Certainly it might, on this interpretation of the Epicureans’ own account be true, if he’s hit by a bus this afternoon, that he did not live a complete life.) That sounds like a good cause for mental anxiety and a threat to one’s ataraxia…
2. Part of the difficulty comes, it seems to me, from the Epicureans’ denial of an intermediate state. In that case a life of more pleasure is a life of less pain and vice versa. It is not always clear in these texts which of these following forms in intended for the comparison:
(i) between two equally long lives, one (a) of longer-lasting pleasure and shorter-lasting pain and another (b) of shorter-lasting pleasure and longer-lasting pain.
(ii) between two lives, one (c) of long-lasting pleasure which ends in death and another (d) of shorter-lasting pleasure which ends in death.
It seems to me we are supposed to prefer (a) to (b) but to think that (c) and (d) are equally valuable.
3. It is possible that Philodemus had a somewhat softer view than Epicurus and was more prepared to say that some duration of a pain-free life was necessary for completeness. Certainly, the evidence from Cicero shows that the Epicureans came under fire for their view or, at least, that their view was thought perplexing. It would be hard to demonstrate a difference between Philodemus and Epicurus but it might be worth holding on to the idea that they don’t necessarily have to be in absolute agreement on all details. Voula Tsouna’s new *The ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford, 2008) has a very good chapter on this.
Here’s a working list of some putative evidence that Epicureans would not be unfriendly toward some kind of quantitative analysis of pleasure:
–KD 3 (uses the term ‘megethous’).
–As Dan noted, the above mentioned Philodemus quote from De Morte uses ‘megethous’.
–The ‘amounts’ interpretation of KD 19. (KD 4, 18, 20, and 21 are ostensibly weaker evidence).
–And last but not least, I found a passage from *Report of Epicurus’ Ethical Views*: DL 10.117-121 (see page 44 of *The Epicurus Reader*):
121a. Happiness is conceived of in two ways: the highest happiness, which is that of god and does not admit of further intensification, and that which the addition and subtraction of pleasures.
Not only does this seem to be pro-quantitative talk, but DL 121a also arguably supports the “split view about duration” that I mentioned earlier.
A working list of some putative evidence that Epicureans would not be unfriendly toward the view that the duration of pleasure and/or pain matters to some extent and in some sense:
–Vatican Saying 4. Every pain is easily disregarded; for any intense pain is brief, and the suffering brought on by a physical pain that lasts long is slight. (Epicurus.info)
(Note the corresponding point in Letter to Menoeceus 133: “…the limit of bad things [is] either short of trouble or for a short time…” [translated by Hutchinson]). Also note KD 4.
Vatican Saying 4 (and possibly Letter to Menoeceus 133) strikes me as evidence that duration matters to some extent for Epicurus. Namely, it is because intense pains have short durations that we can disregard them. Presumably, if they had longer durations, they would be harder to disregard (one might say that they would be worse).
–As I mentioned previously, Letter to Menoeceus 129 could be evidence that duration matters. But this evidence is perhaps weaker. And I am not sure if the “for a long time” is supposed to refer to the pleasures or the pains. In the Inwood and Hutchinson translations, it looks like the “for a long time” refers to the pleasures. This reading would arguably help the interpretation that duration matters. But in the epicurus.net and Epicurus Wiki translations, the “for a long time” refers to the pains. This reading would arguably not support the interpretation that duration matters. Lastly, the Epicurus.info translation simply leaves out the “for a long time” — perhaps because the meaning of the “for a long time” is unclear or ambiguous.
Voula Tsouna (in *The Ethics of Philodemus*, p. 255) thinks that “Epicurus leaves the role of duration underdetermined.” This is probably true. But it is important to note that Tsouna mentions this in the context of KD 18-21, which deal with the limit of pleasure. The split view about duration — supported by DL 121a — allows that duration does not matter (or matters very little) in the context of maximal pleasure, but that it does matter in the context of sub-maximal pleasure and pain (and the latter is arguably supported by VS 4).