Translation differences concerning pleasure May 30, 2008
Posted by tpummer in Epicurus, Pleasure.trackback
I am beginning to think that some of the Epicurus.info translations of the Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings concerning pleasure might be more careful and precise than those found in The Epicurus Reader. Three points.
1. Note the controversy over PD 19 mentioned previously. Though I’d like it if PD 19 did contain the term ‘amount’, it does not strictly appear in the Greek; and the Epicurus.info translation does not mention ‘amount’, but the The Epicurus Reader (potentially misleadingly) does.
2. For Vatican Saying 4, The Epicurus Reader reads “Every pain is easy to despise…” whereas Epicurus.info reads “Every pain is easily disregarded…” I have not looked at the actual Greek (or rather, begged someone who reads Greek to look at the actual Greek for me), but it seems to me that the Epicurus.info translation makes much more sense. To be sure, The Epicurus Reader translation likely means ‘despise’ in the sense of being unworthy of one’s concern (and so is similar to ‘disregard’), but ‘despise’ often means ’strongly dislike’ or ‘detest’. This could be misleading. ‘Disregard’ seems better than ‘despise’, as it avoids these ambiguities.
3. A point about PD 3: The Epicurus Reader translation reads:
The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)
But this seems to imply that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. This can’t be what Epicurus meant, right?
The Epicurus.info translation of PD 3 avoids this, it reads:
Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)
This version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain.
Knowing the best translations/interpretations of these (and other) passages concerning pleasure will likely prove important if we are to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of Epicurean hedonism.
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Theron, you say : But this [ER translation of PD 3] seems to imply that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. This can’t be what Epicurus meant, right?
Why can’t this be what Epicurus means? To say that the translation conflates them is to say that you’re correct in interpreting what Epicurus means.
It seems like what is happening is perhaps just that Epicurus is being ambiguous (in the Greek) and different translators are writing what they think he meant. One is closer to your interpretation, one is further away. I’m not sure making the issue one of looking at the Greek will help because it might still just be an interpretation question. But I don’t know Greek so this is just speculation.
It pleases me that the renditions of the Principal Doctrines on my website are held in such high regard. Fidelity to the ancient Greek is an issue that has been brought up more than once on this blog, and on that score you should have a look at the interlinear edition of the Principal Doctrines that is now under development on the Epicurus Wiki, also hosted at epicurus.info.
Start here:
http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_1
It’s not perfect. You’ll need to view this page in IE in order for the lines to wrap correctly. And there are still issues to sort out regarding the association of words in the reordered English. But you should be able appreciate the potential power of this tool. For instance, hover over each Greek word, and a tool-tip will pop up showing its transliteration into our alphabet and its most prototypical dictionary definition. Play with it!
I’ll have more to say about the Epicurus Wiki in general very soon. In the meantime, since they have been mentioned, here are direct links to:
http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3
http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_19
Per, your speculation makes sense to me, but I don’t know Greek either. If you’re right, then I might not have a legitimate complaint against The Epicurus Reader with regard to PD 3. My apologies to Inwood and Gerson!
I think the ER translation of PD 3 (and, as you point out, possibly the actual Greek) implies that ‘maximal pleasure’ or ‘the limit of pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ mean the same thing. I do not think this accurately reflects Epicurus’ conception of pleasure. Why not? Here are three reasons:
1. It would be odd to mention a ‘limit’ of pleasure or the ‘highest’ pleasure, if all pleasure is at that limit. Why not just say ‘pleasure’? It seems to me that the very notion of a limit of pleasure or highest or greatest pleasure (which is mentioned in many places in addition to PD 3, e.g., PD 18-20; Letter to Menoeceus 133) requires some contrasting notion of lesser pleasure (or pleasure that is not at the limit of pleasure) in order to be meaningful.
2. In Letter to Menoeceus 129, Epicurus talks in terms of lesser and greater pleasures.
3. For Epicurus, there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain. This seems to me to mean that ‘more pain’ and ‘less pleasure’ mean the same thing; and ‘less pain’ and ‘more pleasure’ mean the same thing. Epicurus thinks that there are degrees of pain (this is fairly directly suggested in PD 4, 8; VS 4; Letter to Menoeceus 129). Since Epicurus accepts the notions of ‘more pain’, ‘less pain’, and ‘no pain’, he accepts the corresponding notions of ‘less pleasure’, ‘more pleasure’, and ‘maximal pleasure’. (Note: if you do not like to discuss pleasure/pain in potentially quantitatively thick terms like ‘more’, ‘less’, or ‘maximal’, you can substitute in ‘greater’, ‘lesser’, and ‘greatest’).
There might be textual evidence that more directly bears on this, but these are some of the factors that led me to doubt how accurately the ER translation of PD 3 portrays Epicurus’ conception of pleasure.
I’d like to rescind something I said above. While I do think that, for Epicurus, ‘lesser pain’ means ‘greater pleasure’, ‘lesser pleasure’ means ‘greater pain’ and so on, this does not immediately follow from the assumption that there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain (as I suggested above in [3]). There being only one degree of pleasure is consistent with the assumption that there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain. Pain may come in various degrees, and the only degree of pleasure is identified with the absence of all pain. Again, I do not think this is Epicurus’ view (see [1] and [2] above), but I was sloppy in (3).
Also, here’s the Epicurus Wiki translation of PD 3; I remain somewhat confused about the best translation, though:
http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3
It seems to me that because of his denial of the intermediate state Epicurus is able to say both (i) that ‘less pain’ is ‘more pleasure’ and also, when he is keen to stress that katastematic pleasure is the removal of all pain, that (ii) pleasure cannot be increased but merely varied. (i) might appear to be somewhat ‘looser’ talk, but it is not I think inconsistent with his views since, after all, he does recognise kinetic pleasures some of which at least are involved in the processes of removing pain. Certainly, this makes what he says often rather tricky to understand, but that is probably right. I don’t think it is just a question of getting the right translation because the Greek (or, for other sources, the Latin) is often such that it requires careful interpretation.
Thanks James. What you say about the possible role of katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the context of KD 3 makes sense to me.
So, ‘katastematic pleasure’ = ‘ataraxia and aponia’ = ‘maximal pleasure’ = ‘the limit of pleasure’. No problem here, right?
Would a similar set of equations work for ‘kinetic pleasures’? For instance:
1. ‘kinetic pleasure’ = ’sub-maximal pleasure’
2. ‘more kinetic pleasure’ = ‘less pain’; ‘less kinetic pleasure’ = ‘more pain’
Or is it possible to increase or decrease kinetic pleasure(s) without changing one’s level of pain? KD 3 arguably suggests this is not possible, i.e., that something like (2) is true.
Well, that really depends on what you take kinetic pleasures to be. It seems to me that they might play one or both of these roles:
a. they are the pleasures involved in the process of removing a pain (e.g. the pleasure of drinking when thirsty).
In this case it seems that, yes, in a sense ‘more’ kinetic pleasure is less pain. But you might want to wonder about that: don’t you enjoy a cold drink more the more thirsty you are? (I think Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias might well have got that part right…) You might on the other hand think that Aristotle’s idea in NE 7.12, 1152b33ff. also has a point: perhaps it is because not being thirsty is pleasant that removing a thirst is pleasant, in an accidental way. (I think it makes good sense to read Epicurus on pleasure closely with the earlier discussion of pleasure in Plato and then Aristotle, particularly on the question whether pleasure is essentially a ‘kinesis’, a change or process.)
b. they are the pleasures involved when one is already pain-free. So when I take a drink although I am not thirsty, the pleasure I then get is ‘kinetic’ and merely ‘varies’ or ‘embellishes’ the pleasant state I was already in.
In this case, it seems to me not to be true that more kinetic pleasure = less pain.
Thanks. I appreciate your helpful comments. I think I’ll need to rethink those equations I mentioned.
Assuming one is not pain-free, I wonder whether Epicurus thinks that kinetic pleasure always or necessarily decreases pain (this need not be inconsistent with Aristotle’s idea). He clearly thinks that kinetic pleasure could decrease pain (assuming one is not pain-free), but I wonder if he drops any hints about whether or not it must decrease pain in this case. Not sure.
Another question about Epicurean hedonism in the context of sub-maximal pleasure: in a different post, you made the following comment:
“(i) between two equally long lives, one (a) of longer-lasting pleasure and shorter-lasting pain and another (b) of shorter-lasting pleasure and longer-lasting pain.
(ii) between two lives, one (c) of long-lasting pleasure which ends in death and another (d) of shorter-lasting pleasure which ends in death.
It seems to me we are supposed to prefer (a) to (b) but to think that (c) and (d) are equally valuable.”
I think you (James) are right that, for Epicurus, (a) is better than (b). It also seems right that Epicurus would say that (c) and (d) are equally valuable if the pleasure involved is maximal pleasure (ataraxia). But what if the pleasure involved in (c) and (d) is sub-maximal (perhaps most, but not all, pain and distress have been removed)? Do you know if Epicurus drops any hints about this sort of case?
I don’t think they address this kind of case directly. But it strikes me that this is for a rather good reason. They do, to be sure, appear to think that most people’s lives are pretty miserable (i.e. full of pain) but they also and importantly think that a good (pleasant, i.e. pain-free) life is relatively easy to achieve and maintain provided you get your beliefs right. (Certainly you should contrast the Stoics’ pessimism about our chances of achieveing virtue or Plato and Aristotle’s general acceptance that only a very few will ever live a life of eudaimonia). On the Epicurean view, if you a person is not happy (that is, not pain-free) then it might seem right think a shorter life is preferable (less pain). But the Epicureans seem to have taken a dim view of suicide in general precisely because they think in only the most extreme cases is it in fact impossible by some means in our power to arrange our beliefs and affairs so as to achieve ataraxia. These concerns and claims would appear to override any real interest on their part in ranking in relative terms different unhappy lives. Such a procedure seems to be beside the point in their view and — perhaps — potentially obscures the point that we can and should all be aiming for achievable ataraxia.
This is basically what I suspected — I’ll continue searching to see if Epicurus (or maybe Philodemus) drop any hints at all about such cases, just to be sure, though. Indeed, I was assuming lives (c) and (d) have already ended, or we can (reasonably) know when they will end (and that they will not reach ataraxia). I tend to agree with your reading of Epicureanism on the accessibility of ataraxia; though there was some dispute in our seminar as to how easy it is to achieve ataraxia. While Epicureans differ from the Stoics on suicide, presumably Epicureans would still allow that there are some circumstances where it would be worse to continue living.
Hi again, James. When I was writing up my last comment, I forgot about some of your helpful discussion on this issue in chapter 5 (especially pages 206-9) of your book, Facing Death. You indeed note some of the (rare) circumstances in which Epicureans would allow suicide.
In De Finibus I.49, Torquatus says:
“A strong soul is so readied against pains that it remembers that the greatest are curtailed by death, the small ones are punctuated by long intervals of peace, and we are in control of those of a medium strength so that if they can be endured we endure them and if not we may leave life calmly if it does not please us, just as we may leave the theatre.”
On pages 206-7 of Facing Death, you (James) note: “Importantly, [suicide] is done calmly and rationally (aequo animo); it is the result of a calculation that the alternative would be a continued life of pain. Provided life has pleasure left in it, we will continue to live.”
Perhaps one way of reformulating my question about the comparison of lives (c) and (d) would be to ask: How much pleasure must be left in a life for it to be rational to continue to live? As you suggest, perhaps Epicureans do not offer an answer to this question, or at least not a definite one (unlike Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 130 n — as noted in your ‘Chin up!’ blog post: http://kenodoxia.blogspot.com/2008/05/chin-up.html).