Smooth Motions

I’m not swamped with grading for the time being, so I’m now back to my obsession with Epicurean hedonism…

In my last post (Translation differences concerning pleasure), I offered three reasons for favoring the Epicurus.info version of PD 3 to the Epicurus Reader (ER) version. Then I sort of took back one of the reasons (the one about the lack of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain). Now I’d like to offer two more reasons for going with the Epicurus.info version. But first, just so we’re all on the same page, here again are the two versions of PD 3:

OLD NEWS:

The Epicurus Reader:

The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)

Epicurus.info:

Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)

I claimed that the ER version of PD 3 basically implies that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. The Epicurus.info version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain. My initial criticisms of the ER version revolved around the idea that it does not make sense to talk about the ‘limit’ of pleasure or ‘greatest’/'greater’ pleasure (which Epicurus does elsewhere — not just in PD 3) if there is just one degree of pleasure.

NEW NEWS:

1. My Greek translator (Dan) brought it to my attention that the second sentence of PD 3 has a definite article (‘to’) in front of ‘pleasure’. See: http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3

This may suggest that ‘the pleasure’ referred to in the second sentence is the same as the notion of pleasure referred to in the first sentence — namely, ‘maximal pleasure’, rather than ‘pleasure’ simpliciter.

2. Note what both versions of PD 3 say in the second sentence: that (maximal) pleasure and pain do not occur simultaneously. Some (e.g., Nikolsky 2001) have noted that this is inconsistent with what appears to be Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasures. In particular, when one is not already in a pain-free state, kinetic pleasures decrease pain by being involved in the process of desire-satisfaction. But since the process of satisfying a desire is a temporally extended event (it does not occur in an instant), presumably at some point one is both experiencing some kinetic pleasure (due to the partial satisfaction of desire D) and some pain (as desire D is not yet fully satisfied). (Perhaps it helps to imagine, for instance, the desire to drink a tall glass of water). According to this interpretation of Epicurus’ notion of kinetic pleasure, one can experience pain and pleasure simultaneously. But this is inconsistent with PD 3. I believe (Nikolsky notes) that this inconsistency has moved some to reinterpret Epicurus on kinetic pleasure. But I do not think we need to, and perhaps nor should we. For it is only inconsistent with the ER version of PD 3. On the Epicurus.info version, it is maximal pleasure that must not be concurrent with pain, not pleasure simpliciter. I wonder if anyone’s thought of interpreting PD 3 along the Epicurus.info lines for this reason.