Smooth Motions

I’m not swamped with grading for the time being, so I’m now back to my obsession with Epicurean hedonism…

In my last post (Translation differences concerning pleasure), I offered three reasons for favoring the Epicurus.info version of PD 3 to the Epicurus Reader (ER) version. Then I sort of took back one of the reasons (the one about the lack of an intermediate state between pleasure and pain). Now I’d like to offer two more reasons for going with the Epicurus.info version. But first, just so we’re all on the same page, here again are the two versions of PD 3:

OLD NEWS:

The Epicurus Reader:

The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)

Epicurus.info:

Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)

I claimed that the ER version of PD 3 basically implies that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. The Epicurus.info version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain. My initial criticisms of the ER version revolved around the idea that it does not make sense to talk about the ‘limit’ of pleasure or ‘greatest’/'greater’ pleasure (which Epicurus does elsewhere — not just in PD 3) if there is just one degree of pleasure.

NEW NEWS:

1. My Greek translator (Dan) brought it to my attention that the second sentence of PD 3 has a definite article (‘to’) in front of ‘pleasure’. See: http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3

This may suggest that ‘the pleasure’ referred to in the second sentence is the same as the notion of pleasure referred to in the first sentence — namely, ‘maximal pleasure’, rather than ‘pleasure’ simpliciter.

2. Note what both versions of PD 3 say in the second sentence: that (maximal) pleasure and pain do not occur simultaneously. Some (e.g., Nikolsky 2001) have noted that this is inconsistent with what appears to be Epicurus’ conception of kinetic pleasures. In particular, when one is not already in a pain-free state, kinetic pleasures decrease pain by being involved in the process of desire-satisfaction. But since the process of satisfying a desire is a temporally extended event (it does not occur in an instant), presumably at some point one is both experiencing some kinetic pleasure (due to the partial satisfaction of desire D) and some pain (as desire D is not yet fully satisfied). (Perhaps it helps to imagine, for instance, the desire to drink a tall glass of water). According to this interpretation of Epicurus’ notion of kinetic pleasure, one can experience pain and pleasure simultaneously. But this is inconsistent with PD 3. I believe (Nikolsky notes) that this inconsistency has moved some to reinterpret Epicurus on kinetic pleasure. But I do not think we need to, and perhaps nor should we. For it is only inconsistent with the ER version of PD 3. On the Epicurus.info version, it is maximal pleasure that must not be concurrent with pain, not pleasure simpliciter. I wonder if anyone’s thought of interpreting PD 3 along the Epicurus.info lines for this reason.

I am beginning to think that some of the Epicurus.info translations of the Principle Doctrines and Vatican Sayings concerning pleasure might be more careful and precise than those found in The Epicurus Reader. Three points.

1. Note the controversy over PD 19 mentioned previously. Though I’d like it if PD 19 did contain the term ‘amount’, it does not strictly appear in the Greek; and the Epicurus.info translation does not mention ‘amount’, but the The Epicurus Reader (potentially misleadingly) does.

2. For Vatican Saying 4, The Epicurus Reader reads “Every pain is easy to despise…” whereas Epicurus.info reads “Every pain is easily disregarded…” I have not looked at the actual Greek (or rather, begged someone who reads Greek to look at the actual Greek for me), but it seems to me that the Epicurus.info translation makes much more sense. To be sure, The Epicurus Reader translation likely means ‘despise’ in the sense of being unworthy of one’s concern (and so is similar to ‘disregard’), but ‘despise’ often means ’strongly dislike’ or ‘detest’. This could be misleading. ‘Disregard’ seems better than ‘despise’, as it avoids these ambiguities.

3. A point about PD 3: The Epicurus Reader translation reads:

The removal of all feeling of pain is the limit of the magnitude of pleasures. Wherever a pleasurable feeling is present, for as long as it is present, there is neither a feeling of pain nor a feeling of distress, nor both together. (Italics mine)

But this seems to imply that there is no difference between ‘maximal pleasure’ and ‘pleasure’ — they both involve the removal of all pain and distress. This can’t be what Epicurus meant, right?

The Epicurus.info translation of PD 3 avoids this, it reads:

Pleasure reaches its maximum limit at the removal of all sources of pain. When such pleasure is present, for as long as it lasts, there is no cause of physical nor mental pain present – nor of both together. (Italics mine)

This version of PD 3 does not conflate ‘maximal pleasure’ with ‘pleasure’, as it consistently refers to the former. I think it makes sense read Epicurus as saying that maximal pleasure involves the removal of all pain, but that sub-maximal pleasure is only the removal of most or some pain.

Knowing the best translations/interpretations of these (and other) passages concerning pleasure will likely prove important if we are to arrive at the most plausible interpretation of Epicurean hedonism.

As many of you know, I’m writing on Epicureanism and death. I’ve decided to specifically focus on the relation between Epicurean hedonism and the neutrality of death. Here are two things that have been giving me headaches:

(1) It has been said at various points throughout the quarter that, on the Epicurean conception of hedonism, pleasures cannot be ‘added up’ and/or that, for Epicurus, it does not make sense to talk of ‘amounts’ of pleasure. But I am having a hard time finding any clear Epicurean statements of or arguments for this claim.

To be sure, it is dubious Epicurus would go for Bentham’s hedonic calculus, but is there any clear evidence that Epicurus would object to any quantitative analysis of pleasure?

If there is, then my project might be in trouble.

Does Epicurus ever talk in terms of amounts of pleasure? Are there any reasons to think that talking in terms of amounts of pleasure would be incompatible with Epicureanism?

For instance, in Principle Doctrine 19, I thought that Epicurus might have meant something like ‘amount’. Here are three different translations I found:

(i): Inwood translation: Unlimited time and limited time contain equal [amounts of] pleasure, if one measures its limits by reasoning.

(ii): Warren translation: The infinite time has as much pleasure as the finite, if one measures pleasure’s limits with reason.

(iii): Furley translation: Infinite time contains the same amount of pleasure as finite time, if you measure the limits by calculation.

Yesterday, after noticing some notion of ‘amount of pleasure’ in all three of my translations of PD 19, I became optimistic that Epicurus really meant some amount or quantity of pleasure. But Dan burst my bubble. That is, Dan pointed out that the word ‘amount’ does not show up in the Greek. PD 19 only says that the pleasures are the same (perhaps, in quality) or equal — not necessarily equal in amount. Moreover, Dan called attention to the difference between “same pleasure as” and “as much pleasure as.” The latter has an explicitly quantitative connotation that the former need not.

If there is evidence from other Epicurean writings that ‘amounts’ talk is acceptable, then all this fuss over the precise translation of PD 19 might be irrelevant. Otherwise, these translations of PD 19 might be somewhat misleading.

In Warren’s book (Facing Death, pp. 143-144), I found a passage from Philodemus (De Morte) that also uses the term ‘amount’ (it seems to be restatement of PD 19 and 20):

…because any length of time naturally produces pleasure for all — provided one recognizes pleasure’s limits — and because of the fact that at the same time the flesh immediately receives the amount of pleasure equal to what an unlimited length of time provides…

Are there linguistic or philosophical reasons for taking the putative Epicurean quantitative talk seriously, or not?

(2) For Epicurean hedonism, does the duration of pleasure matter at all? In other words, given a pleasure of some intensity, is it better to have that pleasure (at that same intensity) for more time? Is it worse to have a pain for more time?

Some discussion of duration can be found in Letter to Menoeceus (in 126 and 129). In 126:

And just as he does not unconditionally choose the largest amount of food but the most pleasant food, so he savours not the longest time but the most pleasant. (Inwood translation)

I do not think this necessarily implies that, for Epicurus, duration does not matter at all. Maybe duration does not matter at all. Maybe it does, but it matters (much) less than quality. Or maybe Epicurus is only (rather non-controversially) pointing out that duration is not to be unconditionally chosen.

In 129:

…sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount of what is uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. (Inwood translation)

…there are times when we pass over many pleasures, when there is more disagreeableness for us in consequence; and we believe many pains to be better than pleasures, if and when a greater pleasure accompanies us for a long time if we endure the pains. (Hutchinson translation)

In both translations of 129, it seems that some weight is accorded to duration. If intensity or quality is all that matters, Epicurus might have just said that many pains are to be chosen over pleasures when a greater (i.e., more intense; high-quality) pleasure follows, and left it at that. Why mention “for a long time” if duration is totally irrelevant?

Long and Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers) seem to agree with me (therefore I cannot be completely crazy, right?):

Epicurus is not saying, as some have thought he was, that time as no bearing on the quantity of pleasure, but just that a finite time is as pleasant as an infinite time, provided one has lived a complete life. (p. 154, their italics)

Following Warren (ch. 4), one has lived a “complete life” once one experiences ataraxia (or, on a milder interpretation, experiences it for some given period of time). This seems a sensible way of understanding PD 19-21.

The significance of duration might depend on whether we’re talking about someone in ataraxia. That is, one might accept a split view about the significance of duration and claim that, when discussing the highest pleasure, duration does not matter, but that when discussing ordinary pleasures (not at the limit of pleasure), duration is important. After all, in Letter to Menoeceus 129 where duration is mentioned, it is not mentioned in connection with ataraxia but rather just everyday prudential reasoning. This split view with respect to duration might have some advantages over other views: it seems to fit with the Epicurean discussion on the fear of death (if one achieves ataraxia, one is not missing out on anything by not living forever), but it also putatively avoids Cicero’s objection in De Finibus 2.68 (by claiming that the duration of a pain does matter). I think common sense would judge that, all else equal, it is worse to experience a pain for more time rather than less. The split view would accommodate such a judgment.

Any thoughts on any of this?

Any more reading suggestions?

While I’m at it, I might as well post this other thought I had a while ago. I know imposing modern thought experiments on ancient philosophers may not work, but I wanted to sound other people out on this idea. I assume people are somewhat familiar with the idea behind Robert Nozick’s experience machine. People can get plugged into it and experience the best life they can dream of, presumably for an Epicurean it would be one of ataraxia. The bottom line of this thought experiment is that most people would choose not to go into the experience machine and live their current lives. My question is, is this faulty reasoning from an Epicurean point of view? I know the Epicurean philosophy is about adapting to this life and making it as untroubled as possible, and that this idea might not make sense to an ancient Greek. However, it seems that if confronted with the possibility of experiencing a life of pleasure and ataraxia without any disturbance were presented, shouldn’t the principles of Epicurean philosophy mandate that one take advantage of that possibility?

The life of a human being consists of a complex succession of desires. Because we are not self-sufficient as bodies, we need other bodies to sustain our existence. The lack of these bodies is experienced as pain, which we are motivated to avoid. The satisfaction of our desires is experienced as pleasure, which we are motivated to pursue. For Epicurus, this kind of pleasure–kinetic or “moving” pleasure–is felt as a positive affect. Cicero claims that Epicurus follows the Cyrenaics here is conceiving of pleasure as “an agreeable motion that gladdens the senses” (iucundum motum quo sensus hilaretur) (II.8; cf. 18).

Epicurus is clear in the Letter to Menoeceus (128) that these sorts of episodic pleasures by themselves do not constitute the end. That is identified with the state in which we are free of pain (aponia) and mental disturbance (ataraxia). One question that arose today is whether this state of “katastematic pleasure” is experienced as a distinct kind of positive affect, or whether it is just the state in which we satisfy (necessary) bodily desires and enjoy kinetic pleasure without interruption. Here’s how I think of these as being related.

An ordinary life is one in which we are led hither and thither by unregulated desires, satisfying some and failing to satisfy many others (=> followed by => indicates a satisfied desire; => followed by X, an unsatisfied desire):

=>=>X=>=>=>X=>X=>=>X etc.

A disciplined life is one in which we regulate our desires in the way recommended by Epicurus. We limit our desires to those things that we cannot live without (barley cakes and water) and take other things only when they can be easily had without painful consequences. In this case, ideally, we enjoy an uninterrupted flow of kinetic pleasure:

=>=>=>=>=>=>=>=>=>etc.

When we are in this state we enjoy a life that is free from bodily pain. So we have realized the first conjunct of the Epicurean end: the state of aponia. Now what exactly is it to be in that state? Is it to experience some other positive affect over and above the succession of kinetic pleasures? I don’t think so. Rather, it is just to be in the state in which we experience kinetic pleasure without interruption. This is brought out in Cicero’s contrast between voluptas in actu and voluptas in stabilitate (II.16). It is what Epicurus describes as the limit of the pleasures of the flesh, which are not increased but only varied (PD 18).

The disciplined life, however, is not yet the Epicurean life, because even if we enjoy a life free of bodily pain, we can still suffer from psychic pain, or mental disturbance. We do so as long as we have failed to reason out “the goal and limit of the flesh” and dissolve our fears of the gods and death (PD 18, 20). We worry about whether we will be able to continue satisfying our desires into an indefinite future (including a life after death); we worry about whether our life could be better than it is in terms of our success, social standing and the kinds of pleasure we enjoy. In short, even if all our physical needs are supplied and we are free of bodily pain, we can still be miserable because of our beliefs about the possibility of desire satisfaction.

Ataraxia comes in our understanding that we have, or can have without difficulty, everything we need to make our life complete: “He who has learned the limits of life knows that it is easy to provide that which removes the feeling of pain owing to want and make one’s whole life perfect. So there is no need for things which involve struggle” (PD 21; cf. 19-20). When we understand this, we eliminate the anxiety that stands between us and the end of happiness (or a happy life).

Now, the question can still be raised whether ataraxia itself is (or involves) a distinct kind of positive affect–a so-called “mental pleasure.” It is certainly conceived in this way by some later thinkers, but I don’t see much evidence for it in Epicurus. First, in contrast to the kinetic pleasures, which are “agreeable motions” of the flesh, aponia and ataraxia are both represented negatively in terms on the absence of pain or disturbance. Second, we have reason to believe that for Epicurus the pleasure that we feel when we have achieved the end is just the kinetic pleasures of the body–now appropriately limited, regulated and unaccompanied by beliefs about their fragility, insufficiency, etc. Admittedly, in the same text he does go on to speak of the “joy of the mind” (laetitia mentis), but this he says consists in nothing more than “the expectation that our nature will avoid pain while acquiring all those things I just mentioned [i.e. bodily pleasures]” (Tusc. Disp. 3.41-2 = Text 19).

I’ve got a question about what we were discussing toward the end of seminar today. It concerns the rational temporal allocation of pleasure, and whether and why Epicurus is really opposed to a pleasure-maximizing view. When it comes to the rationality of allocating pleasure and pain across time, I think I more or less grasp the difference between Epicurus and the Cyrenaics. The Cyrenaics are presentists; they are only concerned with pleasures and pains in the present. Epicurus, on the other hand, is concerned with pleasures and pains throughout one’s entire life.

I am having more trouble understanding the ways in which Epicurus’ view is supposed to significantly contrast with classical utilitarian views (in particular, Bentham and Sidgwick) on this score. I am here abstracting away from the various ways in which the classical utilitarians may differ from Epicurus on (1) what pleasure consists in (e.g., a pain-free experience, an experience that qualitatively feels enjoyable, an experience that one desires to continue, etc.) and (2) what a pleasurable episode consists in (e.g., the sum of all the momentary pleasures from t1 to t2; a particular state that persists between t1 and t2). That is to say, I am here less concerned with the nature of the unit of prudence, but more concerned with how it ought to be allocated across time.

Of course, one might reasonably object that these two questions cannot be separated, though it seems plausible to me that they can. Assuming we are only dealing with the latter question — “how should the unit of prudence be rationally temporally allocated?” — I am not sure how or why Epicurus would substantively differ from Bentham or Sidgwick. I am assuming that the Benthamite/Sidgwickian view about rational prudence roughly says: it is rational to maximize the ratio of pleasure to pain across all of the time-slices of one’s life, giving equal weight to all time-slices in allocating pleasure and pain. (Of course, utilitarians think this applies interpersonally as well as intertemporally, but I am here only concerned with prudence, and not morality or other-regarding rationality).

One objection to the Benthamite view might be that pleasure cannot be quantified — that we do not readily have, or cannot possibly build, a ‘hedonometer’. But this seems to be an empirical or descriptive claim. It also seems to only address the practicality of implementing a full-blown Benthamite project, not whether a Bentham-like view is plausible in theory. A related worry is that we cannot perform the pleasure calculus because it is too impractical. But then this is a claim about the practicality of the pleasure calculus as a decision procedure, not as a criterion of prudential rationality or what makes one’s life go best. One might think that one’s life goes better just in case one has a higher pleasure to pain ratio and nevertheless agree that it would be impractical to apply the pleasure calculus for every decision one makes (and prescribe some other decision procedure). Yet another worry is that one cannot give equal weight to all time-slices because one cannot be certain that one will actually experience temporally distant time-slices. But then one is not failing to be neutral about time-slices, but only taking into account that distant time-slices are less probable than more proximate ones, and so, ceteris paribus, their expected utility is lower. This does not imply that distant future pleasures are intrinsically worth less than proximate future pleasures. (Though note that there may be some disagreement between Bentham and Sidgwick on this last point, as Bentham may count propinquity as an actual dimension of pleasure).

Perhaps I have overlooked an obvious way in which Epicurus differs from Bentham or Sidgwick when it comes to rationally temporally allocating pleasures and pains. I have a suspicion that Epicurus has a more fundamental reason for disagreeing with pleasure-maximizing views than any of the ones I have listed. But perhaps this suspicion is misguided. If it is, then I am dubious he really substantively disagrees with pleasure-maximizing views. If it is not, then I am simply puzzled. Assuming X is the only thing that makes a life go well, why does not having more X make a life go even better?