Smooth Motions

Here is the passage from Spinoza’s Ethics I had mentioned in class last week which it seems to me recommends something much like Stoic exercises – committing certain “maxims” or “rules of reason” to memory, “meditating” on them, in order to have them “ready” for application when needs arises. (Note also other similarities: Spinoza’s talk in the passage on the one hand about the “sickness” of the mind, its “vacillations”, and, on the other, the desirability of “moderation”, of the ability to “bear calmly” events, the value of friendship, and the acknowledgment of all things as necessary, etc.).

5p10s. By this power of rightly ordering and connecting the affections of the Body, we can bring it about that we are not easily affected with evil affects. For (by P7) a greater force is required for restraining Affects ordered and connected according to the order of the intellect than for restraining those which are uncertain and random. The best thing, then, that we can do, so long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of living, or sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will be extensively affected by them, and we shall always have them ready [rectam vivendi rationem seu certa vitae dogmata concipere eaque memoriae mandare et rebus particularibus in vita frequenter obviis continuo applicare ut sic nostra imaginatio late iisdem afficiatur et nobis in promptu sint semper].

For example, we have laid it down as a maxim of life [vitae dogmata] (see IVP46 and P46S) that Hate is to be conquered by Love, or Nobility, not by repaying it with Hate in return. But in order that we may always have this rule of reason ready when it is needed, we ought to think about and meditate frequently on the common wrongs of men, and how they may be warded off best by Nobility. For if we join the image of a wrong to the imagination of this maxim, it will always be ready for us (by IIP18) when a wrong is done to us. If we have ready also the principle of our own true advantage, and also of the good which follows from mutual friendship and common society, and keep in mind, moreover, that the highest satisfaction of mind stems from the right principle of living (by IVP52), and that men, like other things, act from the necessity of nature, then the wrong, or the Hate usually arising from it, will occupy a very small part of the imagination, and will easily be overcome. Or if the Anger which usually arises from the greatest wrongs is not so easily overcome, it will still be overcome, though not without some vacillation. And it will be overcome in far less time than if we had not considered these things beforehand in this way (as is evident from P6, P7, and P8). [Ut autem hoc rationis praescriptum semper in promptu habeamus ubi usus erit, cogitandae et saepe meditandae sunt communes hominum injuriae et quomodo et qua via generositate optime propulsentur; sic enim imaginem injuriae imaginationi hujus dogmatis jungemus et nobis in promptu semper erit ubi nobis injuria afferetur. Quod si etiam in promptu habuerimus rationem nostri veri utilis ac etiam boni quod ex mutua amicitia et communi societate sequitur et praeterea quod ex recta vivendi ratione summa animi acquiescentia oriatur et quod homines ut reliqua, ex naturae necessitate agant, tum injuria sive odium quod ex eadem oriri solet, minimam imaginationis partem occupabit et facile superabitur; vel si ira quae ex maximis injuriis oriri solet, non adeo facile superetur, superabitur tamen quamvis non sine animi fluctuatione, longe minore temporis spatio quam si haec non ita praemeditata habuissemus...]

To put aside Fear, we must think in the same way of Tenacity: i.e., we must recount and frequently imagine the common dangers of life, and how they can be best avoided and overcome by presence of mind and strength of character [enumeranda scilicet sunt et saepe imaginanda communia vitae pericula et quomodo animi praesentia et fortitudine optime vitari et superari possunt].

But it should be noted that in ordering our thoughts and images, we must always (by IVP63C and IIIP59) attend to those things which are good in each thing so that in this way we are always determined to acting from an affect of Joy. For example, if someone sees that he pursues esteem too much, he should think of its correct use, the end for which it ought be pursued, and the means by which it can be acquired, not of its misuse and emptiness, and men’s inconstancy [inconstantia], or other things of this kind, which only someone sick [aegritudine] of mind thinks of. For those who are most ambitious are most upset by such thoughts when they despair of attaining the honor they strive for; while they spew forth their Anger, they wish to seem wise. So it is certain that they most desire esteem who cry out most against its misuse, and the emptiness of the world.

Nor is this peculiar to the ambitious–it is common to everyone whose luck is bad and whose mind is weak. For the poor man, when he is also greedy, will not stop talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich. In doing this he only distresses himself, and shows others that he cannot bear calmly either his own poverty, or the wealth of others.

So also, one who has been badly received by a lover thinks of nothing but the inconstancy and deceptiveness of women, and their other, often sung vices. All of these he immediately forgets as soon as his lover receives him again.

One, therefore, who is anxious to moderate his affects and appetites from the love of freedom alone will strive, as far as he can, to come to know the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the gladness which arises from the true knowledge of them, but not at all to consider men’s vices, or to disparage men, or to enjoy a false appearance of freedom. And he who will observe these [rules] carefully–for they are not difficult–and practice them, will soon be able to direct most of his actions according to the command of reason. [Qui itaque suos affectus et appetitus ex solo libertatis amore moderari studet, is quantum potest nitetur virtutes earumque causas noscere et animum gaudio quod ex earum vera cognitione oritur, implere; at minime hominum vitia contemplari hominesque obtrectare et falsa libertatis specie gaudere. Atque haec qui diligenter observabit (neque enim difficilia sunt) et exercebit, nae ille brevi temporis spatio actiones suas ex rationis imperio plerumque dirigere poterit.] (II/287-289, Curley’s translation)

But the passage which probably stands out the most in terms of Spinoza’s explicit adoption of Stoic themes is 4App32, where Spinoza talks in a way which is otherwise rather unusual for him about “duties” proper to us and being in “agreement” with Nature and its order. He also seems to assert that happiness can be reached through understanding alone (“If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this”…). Here is the passage, in its entirety:

But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. So we do not have an absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use. Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, that the power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have avoided those things, and that we are a part of the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we understand this clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is defined by understanding, i.e., the better part of us, will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive to persevere in that satisfaction. For insofar as we understand, we can want nothing except what is necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true. Hence, insofar as we understand these things rightly, the striving of the better part of us agrees with the order of the whole of Nature. [Sed humana potentia admodum limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur atque adeo potestatem absolutam non habemus res quae extra nos sunt, ad nostrum usum aptandi. Attamen ea quae nobis eveniunt contra id quod nostrae utilitatis ratio postulat aequo animo feremus si conscii simus nos functos nostro officio fuisse et potentiam quam habemus non potuisse se eo usque extendere ut eadem vitare possemus nosque partem totius naturae esse cujus ordinem sequimur. Quod si clare et distincte intelligamus, pars illa nostri quae intelligentia definitur hoc est pars melior nostri, in eo plane acquiescet et in ea acquiescentia perseverare conabitur. Nam quatenus intelligimus nihil appetere nisi id quod necessarium est nec absolute nisi in veris acquiescere possumus adeoque quatenus haec recte intelligimus eatenus conatus melioris partis nostri cum ordine totius naturae convenit.] (4App32; II/276, Curley’s translation)