Comments for Smooth Motions

Comment on Principal Doctrine 3 by Dan Schwartz

Dan Schwartz — Tue, 10 Jun 2008 21:14:51 +0000

Erik is correct. The definite article in this case CAN carry the sense of a demonstrative, but it would probably still be used if this sense were not intended.

Comment on Principal Doctrine 3 by Erik Anderson

Erik Anderson — Tue, 10 Jun 2008 06:32:07 +0000

Regarding “New News #1,” you shouldn’t read too much into the definite article at “ton hedonon.” The “Reader’s Guide” at http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrines notes that “Greek tends to preface each and every noun with a definite article; consequently, any verbatim translation to English yields numerous redundant articles that should, of course, be omitted in rendering the meaning in normal, English syntax.”

This situation is not unlike that in Italian, where “la vita e’ bella” or “la donna e’ mobile” conveys “life is good” or “women are fickle” — though literally: “the life is good” or “the woman is fickle.”

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by tpummer

tpummer — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 23:33:57 +0000

Hi again, James. When I was writing up my last comment, I forgot about some of your helpful discussion on this issue in chapter 5 (especially pages 206-9) of your book, Facing Death. You indeed note some of the (rare) circumstances in which Epicureans would allow suicide.

In De Finibus I.49, Torquatus says:

“A strong soul is so readied against pains that it remembers that the greatest are curtailed by death, the small ones are punctuated by long intervals of peace, and we are in control of those of a medium strength so that if they can be endured we endure them and if not we may leave life calmly if it does not please us, just as we may leave the theatre.”

On pages 206-7 of Facing Death, you (James) note: “Importantly, [suicide] is done calmly and rationally (aequo animo); it is the result of a calculation that the alternative would be a continued life of pain. Provided life has pleasure left in it, we will continue to live.”

Perhaps one way of reformulating my question about the comparison of lives (c) and (d) would be to ask: How much pleasure must be left in a life for it to be rational to continue to live? As you suggest, perhaps Epicureans do not offer an answer to this question, or at least not a definite one (unlike Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, p. 130 n — as noted in your ‘Chin up!’ blog post: http://kenodoxia.blogspot.com/2008/05/chin-up.html).

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by tpummer

tpummer — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 19:57:16 +0000

This is basically what I suspected -- I'll continue searching to see if Epicurus (or maybe Philodemus) drop any hints at all about such cases, just to be sure, though. Indeed, I was assuming lives (c) and (d) have already ended, or we can (reasonably) know when they will end (and that they will not reach ataraxia). I tend to agree with your reading of Epicureanism on the accessibility of ataraxia; though there was some dispute in our seminar as to how easy it is to achieve ataraxia. While Epicureans differ from the Stoics on suicide, presumably Epicureans would still allow that there are some circumstances where it would be worse to continue living.

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by James Warren

James Warren — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 18:01:02 +0000

I don’t think they address this kind of case directly. But it strikes me that this is for a rather good reason. They do, to be sure, appear to think that most people’s lives are pretty miserable (i.e. full of pain) but they also and importantly think that a good (pleasant, i.e. pain-free) life is relatively easy to achieve and maintain provided you get your beliefs right. (Certainly you should contrast the Stoics’ pessimism about our chances of achieveing virtue or Plato and Aristotle’s general acceptance that only a very few will ever live a life of eudaimonia). On the Epicurean view, if you a person is not happy (that is, not pain-free) then it might seem right think a shorter life is preferable (less pain). But the Epicureans seem to have taken a dim view of suicide in general precisely because they think in only the most extreme cases is it in fact impossible by some means in our power to arrange our beliefs and affairs so as to achieve ataraxia. These concerns and claims would appear to override any real interest on their part in ranking in relative terms different unhappy lives. Such a procedure seems to be beside the point in their view and — perhaps — potentially obscures the point that we can and should all be aiming for achievable ataraxia.

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by tpummer

tpummer — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 16:59:45 +0000

Thanks. I appreciate your helpful comments. I think I’ll need to rethink those equations I mentioned.

Assuming one is not pain-free, I wonder whether Epicurus thinks that kinetic pleasure always or necessarily decreases pain (this need not be inconsistent with Aristotle’s idea). He clearly thinks that kinetic pleasure could decrease pain (assuming one is not pain-free), but I wonder if he drops any hints about whether or not it must decrease pain in this case. Not sure.

Another question about Epicurean hedonism in the context of sub-maximal pleasure: in a different post, you made the following comment:

“(i) between two equally long lives, one (a) of longer-lasting pleasure and shorter-lasting pain and another (b) of shorter-lasting pleasure and longer-lasting pain.

(ii) between two lives, one (c) of long-lasting pleasure which ends in death and another (d) of shorter-lasting pleasure which ends in death.

It seems to me we are supposed to prefer (a) to (b) but to think that (c) and (d) are equally valuable.”

I think you (James) are right that, for Epicurus, (a) is better than (b). It also seems right that Epicurus would say that (c) and (d) are equally valuable if the pleasure involved is maximal pleasure (ataraxia). But what if the pleasure involved in (c) and (d) is sub-maximal (perhaps most, but not all, pain and distress have been removed)? Do you know if Epicurus drops any hints about this sort of case?

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by James Warren

James Warren — Tue, 03 Jun 2008 10:39:11 +0000

Well, that really depends on what you take kinetic pleasures to be. It seems to me that they might play one or both of these roles:

a. they are the pleasures involved in the process of removing a pain (e.g. the pleasure of drinking when thirsty).

In this case it seems that, yes, in a sense ‘more’ kinetic pleasure is less pain. But you might want to wonder about that: don’t you enjoy a cold drink more the more thirsty you are? (I think Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias might well have got that part right…) You might on the other hand think that Aristotle’s idea in NE 7.12, 1152b33ff. also has a point: perhaps it is because not being thirsty is pleasant that removing a thirst is pleasant, in an accidental way. (I think it makes good sense to read Epicurus on pleasure closely with the earlier discussion of pleasure in Plato and then Aristotle, particularly on the question whether pleasure is essentially a ‘kinesis’, a change or process.)

b. they are the pleasures involved when one is already pain-free. So when I take a drink although I am not thirsty, the pleasure I then get is ‘kinetic’ and merely ‘varies’ or ‘embellishes’ the pleasant state I was already in.

In this case, it seems to me not to be true that more kinetic pleasure = less pain.

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by tpummer

tpummer — Mon, 02 Jun 2008 17:32:45 +0000

Thanks James. What you say about the possible role of katastematic and kinetic pleasures in the context of KD 3 makes sense to me.

So, ‘katastematic pleasure’ = ‘ataraxia and aponia’ = ‘maximal pleasure’ = ‘the limit of pleasure’. No problem here, right?

Would a similar set of equations work for ‘kinetic pleasures’? For instance:

1. ‘kinetic pleasure’ = ’sub-maximal pleasure’

2. ‘more kinetic pleasure’ = ‘less pain’; ‘less kinetic pleasure’ = ‘more pain’

Or is it possible to increase or decrease kinetic pleasure(s) without changing one’s level of pain? KD 3 arguably suggests this is not possible, i.e., that something like (2) is true.

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by James Warren

James Warren — Mon, 02 Jun 2008 10:12:36 +0000

It seems to me that because of his denial of the intermediate state Epicurus is able to say both (i) that ‘less pain’ is ‘more pleasure’ and also, when he is keen to stress that katastematic pleasure is the removal of all pain, that (ii) pleasure cannot be increased but merely varied. (i) might appear to be somewhat ‘looser’ talk, but it is not I think inconsistent with his views since, after all, he does recognise kinetic pleasures some of which at least are involved in the processes of removing pain. Certainly, this makes what he says often rather tricky to understand, but that is probably right. I don’t think it is just a question of getting the right translation because the Greek (or, for other sources, the Latin) is often such that it requires careful interpretation.

Comment on Translation differences concerning pleasure by tpummer

tpummer — Mon, 02 Jun 2008 06:12:39 +0000

I’d like to rescind something I said above. While I do think that, for Epicurus, ‘lesser pain’ means ‘greater pleasure’, ‘lesser pleasure’ means ‘greater pain’ and so on, this does not immediately follow from the assumption that there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain (as I suggested above in [3]). There being only one degree of pleasure is consistent with the assumption that there is no intermediate state between pleasure and pain. Pain may come in various degrees, and the only degree of pleasure is identified with the absence of all pain. Again, I do not think this is Epicurus’ view (see [1] and [2] above), but I was sloppy in (3).

Also, here’s the Epicurus Wiki translation of PD 3; I remain somewhat confused about the best translation, though:

http://wiki.epicurus.info/Principal_Doctrine_3